Insterstitial Exclusivities After Association for Molecular Pathology by Mitchell, Mary & Remus, Dana A.
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
Volume 109
2010
Insterstitial Exclusivities After Association for
Molecular Pathology
Mary Mitchell
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Dana A. Remus
University of New Hampshire Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_fi
Part of the Courts Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the State and Local
Government Law Commons
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review First Impressions by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mary Mitchell & Dana A. Remus, Insterstitial Exclusivities After Association for Molecular Pathology, 109 Mich. L. Rev. First
Impressions 34 (2010).
Available at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_fi/vol109/iss1/5
MITCHELL_&_REMUS_FI_ABOUT_DONE 9/23/2010 3:58 PM 
 
34 
INTERSTITIAL EXCLUSIVITIES AFTER 
ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY  
Mary Mitchell* & Dana A. Remus**†
INTRODUCTION 
 
The high profile cases Bilski v. Kappos1 and Association for Molecular 
Pathology v. United States Patent and Trademark Office2
The exclusions from patentable subject matter developed in the courts 
and have never been codified in the Patent Act. Although some commenta-
tors have argued that the exclusions are Constitutionally mandated, the 
Supreme Court and lower courts have consistently regarded them as judicial 
interpretation of statutory subject matter requirements. Courts and commen-
tators have rationalized the exclusions as protecting the “basic tools” of 
scientific and technological research necessary for innovation. Because of 
the role of the subject matter inquiry in conditioning patent eligibility—a 
role perceived as critical to encouraging innovation—landmark subject mat-
ter cases have often arisen during times of technological change and 
economic upheaval. 
 have renewed 
public debate about the proper scope of patentable subject matter. The sub-
ject matter inquiry has traditionally been treated as a threshold inquiry in 
patent law, serving a gate-keeping function by defining the types of inven-
tions that are eligible for patent protection. The Patent Office and courts 
have approached the subject matter inquiry both by determining whether an 
invention falls into a statutory category—processes, machines, manufac-
tures, or compositions of matter—as well as by determining whether an 
invention falls into a category excluded from subject matter eligibility—
often described in recent decades as laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas. 
The patents at issue in Association for Molecular Pathology cover iso-
lated and purified forms of the human BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes 
responsible for heightened risk of breast and ovarian cancer, as well as me-
thods for determining whether the sequence is present in clinical samples 
submitted by patients for testing. Like many other important subject matter 
                                                                                                                      
 * Law clerk to the Hon. Anthony J. Scirica, United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit. 
 ** Professor of Law, University of New Hampshire Law School. 
 † Suggested citation: Mary Mitchell & Dana A. Remus, Commentary, Interstitial Exclusiv-
ities After Association for Molecular Pathology, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 34 (2010), 
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/109/mitchellremus.pdf. 
 1. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 2. No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2010 WL 1233416 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010). 
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cases, Association for Molecular Pathology raises the policy question of 
whether the patents at issue and other similar patents “cause more harm than 
good to society and technological development.”3
The litigation is noteworthy not only for the legal and policy questions it 
raises, but also because two public interest groups, the American Civil Li-
berties Union (ACLU) and the Public Patent Foundation (PUBPAT), are 
serving as plaintiffs’ counsel. Association for Molecular Pathology is a rare 
instance of impact litigation in patent law, which has remained relatively 
untouched by conventional cause lawyering until recent years. The public 
policies championed by ACLU and PUBPAT are undoubtedly compelling. 
They include the salutary goals of making genetic testing more widely and 
inexpensively available, and encouraging scientific research. We question, 
however, whether judicial interpretation alone of 35 U.S.C. § 101, the eligi-
ble subject matter provision of the Patent Act, can provide the legal 
framework necessary to properly effectuate these policies. 
 The plaintiffs prevailed in 
the district court. If the decision is affirmed by the Federal Circuit, although 
gene patents would not be broadly invalidated, a new avenue would be 
opened for challenging patent validity. 
In this Essay, we suggest that by focusing solely on shaping judicial in-
terpretation of the exclusions from patentable subject matter, proponents of 
an expanded public domain fail to consider the possibility that states will 
expand what we term “interstitial exclusivities”—state-based legal rules, 
such as trade secret law and unfair competition law, that grant certain mar-
ket exclusivities in inventions and that are not subject to federal 
constitutional limits on their duration. We argue that the expansion of exist-
ing interstitial exclusivities and the creation of new ones would alter 
existing incentive structures of intellectual property law, potentially provok-
ing serious negative unintended consequences such as increased uncertainty 
surrounding patent validity, increased business costs, and increased secrecy 
in scientific research. We suggest instead that the creation of a public do-
main envisioned by ACLU and PUBPAT may be best achieved through 
concurrent efforts to enact legislative change, which would explicitly dedi-
cate such inventions to a public domain. 
I. INTERSTITIAL EXCLUSIVITIES 
The problematic but incomplete overlap of federal and state intellectual 
property law has allowed for the creation of state-law exclusivities in inven-
tions. We refer to these laws as “interstitial exclusivities” because they arise 
in the gaps where courts have concluded that federal patent law does not 
preempt state law. 
The relationship between state and federal intellectual property protec-
tions—particularly with respect to the role of patent protection—is 
                                                                                                                      
 3. See Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judg-
ment at 3, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Off., No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2010 
WL 1233416 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2010). 
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complicated. The federal and state regimes overlap and are similar in some 
respects, but differ significantly in others. Congress’s patent and copyright 
authority derives from the Progress Clause of the Constitution, which enu-
merates the power to legislate along with a concurrent restriction requiring 
the exclusive rights to be granted by the federal government only for “li-
mited times.”4 However, trademark, unfair competition, and trade secret law 
are free from these durational limitations.5 Therefore, tensions have arisen 
where trademark, unfair competition, and trade secret protections partially 
overlap with patent or copyright rights, effectively extending elements of 
patent-like or copyright-like coverage for unlimited times.6
Under existing application of preemption principles, states may craft in-
tellectual property laws conveying exclusivities in inventions without 
running afoul of the Patent Act. When state-based intellectual property laws 
are challenged because of perceived conflict with the Patent Act, courts re-
view these statutes using implied conflict preemption principles—the Patent 
Act contains no express preemption provisions, and courts have not applied 
field preemption principles to intellectual property law.  Conflict preemption 
is a notoriously muddled area of law,
 
7 and courts have struggled to apply 
these principles consistently to state intellectual property laws.8 Beginning 
in 1973, the Supreme Court affirmed states’ rights to legislate in the intellec-
tual property field absent direct conflict, despite dicta in earlier cases 
suggesting broad federal preemption of state intellectual property laws.9 
Similarly, it is unlikely that courts will find that state intellectual property 
protections impermissibly burden interstate commerce in all but the most 
extreme circumstances.10
                                                                                                                      
 4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 Accordingly, when a litigant raises a preemption 
 5. Federal trademark and unfair competition law is promulgated under the Commerce 
Clause. Trade secret law is state-based excepting two federal statutes, promulgated under the Com-
merce Clause—the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, which criminalizes trade secret 
misappropriation, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1030, which criminalizes the misappropriation of certain information contained on computers. We 
leave aside debates over whether trademark, trade secret, and unfair competition law are properly 
considered under the rubric of intellectual property. 
 6. IP overlap has been treated extensively in scholarly literature as well as case-law. See, 
e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000); Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox  Film Corp., 539 
U.S. 23 (2003); Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Over-
lapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473 (2004). We leave for another 
day issues of problematic overlap among federal intellectual property rights. 
 7. Compare Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) with Geier v. American Honda Motor 
Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000); see Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1227 (Alito, J., dissenting) (explaining that the 
majority’s conclusion “requires turning yesterday’s dissent into today’s majority opinion”). 
 8. See Arthur Miller, Common Law Protection for Products of the Mind: An “Idea” Whose 
Time Has Come, 119 HARV. L. REV. 705, 745–46 (2006). 
 9. Compare Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 470 (1973) (upholding a California criminal 
piracy law concerning sound recordings), and Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 
(1974) (upholding state-based trade secret laws), and Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. 165, with Sears Roe-
buck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (invalidating a state unfair competition law that 
prohibited copying), and Compco Corp. v. Day Bright Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (same). 
 10. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 558–59; see also Miller, supra note 8, at 750. 
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argument, courts will generally engage in a very limited conflict analysis by 
looking to the stated purpose and legal elements of the state-based 
protection.11
Naturally, business firms game the legal overlap and interplay to gain 
valuable market exclusivities in their products. The correspondence between 
state trade secret and unfair competition laws and federal patent law is not 
one-to-one, nor could it be under existing law. For example, the exclusivity 
conveyed by trade secret law does not generally protect against independent 
development or reverse engineering, and secrecy requirements in some ju-
risdictions can be relatively difficult and onerous to maintain. Likewise, 
unfair competition laws in some jurisdictions require elements such as proof 
of intent to establish violations. Neither trade secret nor unfair competition 
laws are perfect substitutes for patent protection, but they still convey valu-
able elements of market exclusivity, often through liability rather than 
property rules. Recognizing this, businesses have adopted sophisticated ex-
clusivity strategies that consciously engage federal, state, and private law to 
maximize market exclusivity. 
 State lawmakers are left with room to create exclusivities in 
inventions. 
Against this backdrop, we suggest that ACLU, PUBPAT, and their sup-
porters consider the possibility that state lawmakers could extend additional 
or strengthened state-law protections over inventions excluded from federal 
protection because of narrowed subject matter eligibility. States have con-
tinued to make and develop intellectual property law. For example, some 
jurisdictions have recently revived the once disfavored “inevitable disclo-
sure” doctrine in trade secret law, a legal fiction that assumes an employee 
who has certain knowledge will disclose it to a new employer.12 Similarly, a 
recent Seventh Circuit case upheld an exclusive license of trade secrets be-
tween companies, explaining that trade secrets may be bought, sold, and 
licensed regardless of the fact that to do so requires their disclosure.13 And 
in an emerging area of intellectual property law, Utah recently passed the 
Utah Bioprospecting Act, which allows for regulation of bioprospecting 
activities, including the removal from state lands of naturally occurring mi-
croorganisms, plants, or fungi or information about the same for a 
commercial or research purpose.14
Although increased state activity in this area is not a certainty, it is a dis-
tinct possibility in light of the potential value of the inventions at issue. 
 The legislation also mandates a royalty to 
the state resulting from commercialization of the results of bioprospecting 
and criminal penalties for noncompliance. 
                                                                                                                      
 11. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 165–67 (examining the intent behind and legal struc-
ture of state trade secret and trademark protections and explaining they do not conflict with federal 
intellectual property law); Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 642–43 (7th Cir. 1993) (using this 
analytical structure and declining to find conflict between federal trademark and design patent pro-
tection). 
 12. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp. v. Papermaster, No. 08-CV-09078, 2008 WL 4974508  
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2008). 
 13. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roth, 485 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 14. UTAH CODE ANN. § 2:65A-14-102. 
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Simply put, there is nothing to stop state lawmakers from drawing even 
closer to patent law while still avoiding federal preemption, and very little 
reason to believe that state lawmakers would hesitate to do so. 
II. THE LAW OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
If the district court decision is upheld on appeal, it will be a Pyrrhic vic-
tory for proponents of an expanded public domain. Inventions that have 
already been disclosed to the public as part of the patent bargain—which 
requires disclosure in exchange for the strong exclusivity protections con-
ferred by patent law—would begin to create an expanded public domain.15 
For example, the inventions at issue in Association for Molecular Pathology 
would become a part of the public domain because they were disclosed in 
the patents. But inventors and their assignees could keep future inventions 
out of that public domain by strategically gaming the protections of federal, 
state, and private law. A judicial narrowing of patentable subject matter 
through a broadened interpretation of the exclusions would radically alter 
the incentives provided by the web of state and federal intellectual property 
protections. Businesses may increasingly opt for secrecy-based protections 
for certain gene and biotech inventions if patent protection, along with its 
strict disclosure requirements, is no longer available. This could have far-
reaching unintended consequences on commercial and inventive activity, 
including increased secrecy, increased litigation,16 and increased uncertainty 
throughout the system, which is already complicated by non-uniformity of 
state trade secret and unfair competition laws.17
Perhaps more importantly, narrowing the scope of patentable subject mat-
ter through interpretation of the exclusions could dramatically affect the way 
research and development are practiced. In addition to harming those who 
have developed and invested in gene patents in reliance on settled law, a nar-
rowing of patentable subject matter may also chill the openness that patent 
protection fosters regardless of additional state action in the area if businesses 
tend toward secrecy-based intellectual property protections over the disclo-
 
                                                                                                                      
 15. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156–57. In Bonito Boats, as in Association for Molecular 
Pathology, the invention at issue had already been disclosed to the public. The Court explained:  
A state law that substantially interferes with the enjoyment of an unpatented utilitarian or de-
sign conception which has been freely disclosed by its author to the public at large 
impermissibly contravenes the ultimate goal of public disclosure and use which is the center-
piece of federal patent policy. 
Id. 
 16. ACLU has actually stated that it seeks to encourage more litigation over patent validity. 
See Stephen Albaini-Jenei, Bulletproof: Interview with ACLU Attorney Chris Hansen Over Gene 
Patents, Patent Baristas Blog, Nov. 12, 2009, available at, http://www.patentbaristas.com/ 
archives/2009/11/12/. 
 17. See David S. Almeling, Four Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 19 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 769, 776–77, 781 (2009) (noting investigation and litiga-
tion costs associated with nonuniformity of state law and noting choice of law and jurisdictional 
complications). Although forty-six states adopted the Uniform Trade Secret Act, interpretation va-
ries widely, and states have often amended its provisions.  
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sure-based federal patent system. It could easily limit industry-university rela-
tions such as industry sponsored research, important biological material 
transfers between industry and universities, clinical trials, and other collabo-
rations. Such collaborations are necessary for university researchers to have 
access to compounds, animals, and other research resources in cutting edge 
areas of science where industrial research and development is ongoing. 
Moreover, it may deter scientists from publishing and cause businesses to 
further limit publication by their scientists. It almost certainly would limit 
out-licensing opportunities for universities because of the strong culture of 
publication within universities. It would likely cause businesses to seek re-
strictive covenants with their employees more frequently, and to enforce 
such covenants more aggressively. Finally, it may greatly inhibit the move-
ment of scientists and specialists between academia and industry and 
between competing companies. 
As one of us has argued elsewhere, alteration of the patentable subject 
matter inquiry is best left to Congress because of the importance of subject 
matter eligibility to public policy goals, and because of Congress’ institu-
tional competency in addressing complex public policy concerns.18 With 
Association for Molecular Pathology, the process has already started in the 
courts, but it should not end there. Litigation alone has been widely recog-
nized as, at best, an incomplete tool in achieving public policy goals. Impact 
litigation can be an effective means of placing pressure on the other 
branches of government and of publicizing policy issues, but courts are not 
as effective as the other branches of government at crafting and implement-
ing long-term solutions that adequately account for costs and second order 
consequences.19
Given the gaps that already exist in intellectual property law and the 
state-based exclusivities that can and do fill them, proponents of a narrow 
subject matter inquiry should concurrently seek legislative change. The leg-
islative process is riddled with inefficiencies and interest group influence, 
but we think legislative reform is achievable. ACLU and PUBPAT have suc-
cessfully leveraged impact litigation in the areas where it is most effective—
bringing the debate to the public sphere and placing pressure on the other 
branches of government. Even a cursory review of the media coverage of 
the case demonstrates ACLU and PUBPAT’s success at bringing the issues 
to the public’s attention. Other related efforts are also receiving media atten-
tion, such as the recent empirical study by Duke University researchers 
 Those who seek to secure public rights in gene patents and 
other technologies should learn from past examples of litigation aimed at 
enacting social change, which benefited greatly from concurrent political 
efforts to enact legislative solutions.  
                                                                                                                      
 18. See Dana Remus Irwin, Paradise Lost in the Patent Law? Changing Visions of Technol-
ogy in the Subject Matter Inquiry, 60 FLA. L. REV. 775 (2008). 
 19. See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 262 (1977). 
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suggesting that gene patents stifle innovation,20 as well as executive branch 
review of the issue.21
Unfortunately, the legislative solutions proposed thus far would not 
solve the problems created by existing and potentially expanded interstitial 
exclusivities. The NIH committee charged with evaluating gene patents re-
cently proposed to create two exemptions from infringement liability—for 
gene patents used in patient care and for gene patents used in academic re-
search.
 Additionally, the likely appeal of this case to the Fed-
eral Circuit may pressure the executive and legislative branches to act prior 
to a precedential appellate decision. ACLU and PUBPAT’s challenge now is 
to channel the successes of impact litigation into effective legislative reform 
to lower costs and increase access to gene patents and other important tech-
nologies. 
22
We believe the legislative solution that would come closest to creating 
the public domain ACLU and PUBPAT envision would preempt states from 
acting in these areas by including express language both defining the exclu-
sions from patentable subject matter and committing them to the public 
domain. In order for a public domain to be created to cover the exclusions, it 
must keep them within the purview of the federal patent system while si-
multaneously shielding them from state-based exclusivities that lack 
durational limitations and allow or require the secrecy of inventions. 
 Even without the added complication of the pending litigation, the 
exemptions advocated by NIH would alter the incentive structure of intel-
lectual property law, creating incentives for businesses to take advantage of 
existing interstitial exclusivities such as state trade secret law rather than 
seeking patent protection, and for states to expand or create new ones. 
We recognize that such legislation would need to be carefully crafted. 
Notably, partial preemption of state-based intellectual property protections 
could cause jurisdictional uncertainty concerning whether and under what 
circumstances federal courts would have subject matter jurisdiction over 
state-based claims implicating the exclusions.23
                                                                                                                      
 20. See Robert Cook-Deegan & Christopher Heaney, Patently Complicated: Case Studies on 
the Impact of Patenting and Licensing on Clinical Access to Genetic Testing in the United States, 
GENETICS IN MED., Apr. 2010 Supp. at 4. 
 However, Congress is the 
governmental body best suited to weigh options intended to reduce cost and 
 21. For example, the Office of Biotech Activities within the Office of Science Policy of the 
National Institutes of Health recently issued a white paper on gene patents advocating legislative 
reform. See Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society, Revised Draft Report 
on Gene Patents and Licensing Practices and Their Impact on Patient Access to Genetic Tests, 
available at, http://oba.od.nih.gov/SACGHS/sacghs_documents.html#GHSDOC_011 [hereinafter 
SACGHS Whitepaper]. Similarly, the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National 
Economic Council recently issued a call for information on how to improve university commerciali-
zation of technology. See Commercialization of University Research: Request for Information, 75 
Fed. Reg. 57 (Mar. 25, 2010). 
 22. See SACGHS Whitepaper, supra note 21, at 90–91. 
 23. See Christianson v. Colt Indus., 486 U.S. 800 (1988) (holding that when patent law is not 
a required element of a properly pleaded complaint, federal subject matter jurisdiction is limited to 
cases where the relief sought requires adjudication of a patent issue); cf. Holmes Group, Inc. v. 
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002) (holding Federal Circuit jurisdiction does 
not extend over cases where a patent-based cause of action is asserted in a counterclaim). 
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improve access to technologies—whether it be through amendment of the 
Patent Act or through other legislative reforms such as the creation of health 
care subsidies. 
Proponents of a narrowed patentable subject matter portray themselves 
as champions of a public domain. Yet the public domain they seek to create 
through impact litigation is at best elusive and at worst unreachable through 
litigation alone. The patentable subject matter inquiry is a complex issue 
requiring careful consideration by Congress to craft nuanced legal solutions 
that properly mind the gaps of federal intellectual property protection. 
